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In this paper, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is applied to organize 
an inquiry of regulatory compliance motivations. Compliance motivations are examined using 
questionnaire and interview data collected among members of the aquaculture community in Florida 
State. The findings indicate that regulatees are more likely to comply with regulations (1) when they 
perceive enforcement personnel as being knowledgeable; (2) when they have a desire to maintain a 
good reputation with their peers; and (3) when they possess a strong sense of guilt associated with 
non-compliance. This paper contributes to an understanding of compliance motivations in two 
ways; first, by examining the relative influence of motivations emerging from regulatory, community, 
and individual contexts, and second, by applying an institutional framework that supports the 
complementary analysis of motivations associated with each of these different realms.  
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Introduction 
 Over the past several decades, public policy scholars have sought to answer a cardinal 
governance question: what motivates regulatory compliance? In responding to this question, 
scholars have demonstrated the influence of a wide array of factors relating to characteristics of the 
regulatory environment (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Gunningham et al., 2005; May, 2005), regulatory 
design (Ostrom, 1990; 2005; Gezelius, 2003; Hart, 1997), and individual and social contexts 
(Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Hatcher et al., 2000; Ryan and Deci, 
2000; Sutinen and Kuperan; 1999). From this body of research, it is abundantly clear that 
understanding compliance behavior necessitates a concerted analysis of motivations relating to each 
of these different realms. That is, a complete understanding of compliance motivations can only be 
ascertained through analyses that take into account the physical, material, and normative parameters 
that influence behavioral choices. However, few studies have examined such factors in conjunction 
to ascertain their relative influence on shaping individual compliance (May, 2004; 2005; 
Gunningham et al., 2005).  Part of the challenge associated with fashioning such an analysis is 
choosing which variables to include and exclude given the multifarious nature of compliance. As 
Etienne (2011) notes, “compliance theorists have struggled to build theories that would be internally 
consistent and at the same time capable of accounting for the simultaneous pursuit of motivations as 
heterogeneous as material, emotional, or normative goals” (Etienne, 2011, 106).  
  Where theoretical guidance is lacking, analytical frameworks may be instrumental in 
organizing diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry1 (Ostrom, 2007, 25). Frameworks focus on identifying 
                                                          
1 The author’s discussion is based on a distinction outlined by Ostrom (2005; 2007) between frameworks and theories. 
According to Ostrom (2005), “a general framework helps to identify the elements (and the relationships among those 
elements) that one needs to consider for institutions [i.e., rule-based] analysis….Theories focus on a framework and 
make specific assumptions that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict 
outcomes” (Ostrom, 2005, 28). Theories identify specific variables that are predicted to have a certain type of influence 
on the outcome variable(s) of analytical interest.  
3 
 
general relationships between classes of variables presumed to be important in affecting a particular 
outcome.  According to Schlager (2007), “frameworks bound inquiry and direct the attention of the 
analyst to critical features of the social and physical landscape” (Schlager, 2007, 293). Because they 
are not as specific as theories, and thus are not subject to conceptual boundaries in the same ways 
that theories are, frameworks can offer useful analytic platforms where a particular outcome (e.g., 
compliance) is presumed to be influenced by a host of seemingly siloed factors (e.g., material, 
physical, normative).  
In this paper, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework is applied to 
organize an empirical inquiry of compliance motivations, focusing specifically on the following 
questions: How do regulatory-based factors affect compliance? How do individual and community 
based factors affect compliance? What is the relative influence of regulatory, individual, and 
community based factors in affecting compliance? The IAD framework is well suited for an 
examination of these questions as it explicitly calls for the inclusion of classes of variables in one 
analytical lens that are presumed to influence compliance; including, rules, rule monitoring and 
enforcement characteristics, and individual and community attributes (Ostrom, 2005, 15). Within 
each of these classes of variables, specific variables are examined based upon findings in past IAD 
and regulatory scholarship; for example, the perceived appropriateness of regulatory scope, 
perceptions that enforcement personnel are competent, regulatees’ fear of facing financial penalties, 
desires to maintain a good reputation with fellow community members, and feelings of guilt 
associated with non-compliance.  
 The examination of compliance motivations is conducted in the context of aquaculture in 
Florida State using interview and questionnaire data. Aquaculture is defined as “the propagation and 
rearing of aquatic species in controlled or selected environments” (NOAA, 1980). Aquaculture has 
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become an increasingly salient state and national level policy issue as the industry continues to 
expand in response to depleting wild fish stocks (Naylor et al., 2000) and a seafood trade deficit that 
exceeds nine billion dollars (NOAA, 2009). The growth of the industry has been accompanied by 
new regulations, supporting regulatory structures, and industry entrants, as well as heightened public 
attention and scrutiny (Mazur and Curtis, 2006; Amberg and Hall, 2010).  Aquaculture represents a 
theoretically interesting context within which to examine compliance motivations. It is characterized 
by increasing levels of state regulations while industry members have demonstrated a proclivity to 
develop community level best practices and norms. Given this context, aquaculture communities are 
an appropriate setting within which to analyze diverse compliance motivations, including those 
stemming from features of the regulatory environment as well as those that are individual and 
community based.  
 The subsequent sections will begin with a discussion of regulatory and IAD scholarship as is 
relevant for an understanding of compliance motivations, the relationships between the two 
literatures, and the emergent propositions that are explored in this paper. This discussion is followed 
by a description of the study setting and the interview and questionnaire instruments used to acquire 
data therein. The data analysis and results portions of the paper will describe the qualitative and 
quantitative techniques applied to interview and questionnaire data, respectively, and summarize 
findings from the interview, bivariate, and multivariate analyses.  Based on these findings, it is 
concluded that regulatees are more likely to comply with regulations (1) when they perceive 
enforcement personnel as being knowledgeable; (2) when they have a desire to maintain a good 
reputation with their peers; and (3) when they possess a strong sense of guilt associated with non-
compliance. The contribution of this analysis to the study of regulatory compliance is two-fold: 
First, the IAD framework is applied as a lens through which to examine a set of analytical variables 
that both complement and elaborate upon those studied within the regulatory scholarship. Second, 
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the findings lend empirical support to arguments regarding the ascendant role of normative over 
material compliance motivations.   
Regulatory Scholarship and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 Regulatory scholarship, as it pertains to this study, is a body of empirical research that 
highlights variables important in shaping compliance behavior. Given the vast heterogeneity of 
factors demonstrated to affect compliance, no single theory of regulatory compliance has yet been 
developed (Etienne, 2011). It is evident, however, that there are certain categories of factors that 
influence regulatory compliance; for example, characteristics of regulatory design and regulatory 
enforcement. Further, that factors belonging to each of these categories must be analyzed 
concurrently to gain a comprehensive understanding of compliance behavior.  In deciding which 
categories and specific variables are necessary to include in a concerted analysis, one needs an 
approach for organizing a systematic inquiry of them.  
The IAD framework is applied in this paper to illuminate one way to organize an inquiry of 
compliance motivations as it explicitly calls for the inclusion of variable classes relevant for an 
understanding of regulatory compliance. The IAD framework is useful for providing an inclusive 
and systematic examination of the principal analytical components relating to an understanding of 
behavior in rule-governed contexts. It offers a conceptual map and systematic analytical approach 
for understanding how “rules [both those codified in formal documents, such as regulations, and 
those that are reflected in social norms] affect the incentives confronting individuals and their 
resultant behavior” (Ostrom, 2005, 8-9). Incentives are expected to be internalized variably by actors 
whose mental models are affected by “feedback from the world and the shared culture or belief 
system in which an individual is embedded” (Ostrom, 2005, 105).  At the framework level, it is thus 
appropriate for identifying variables of interest when pursuing a systematic investigation of the 
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influences that undergird individuals’ behavioral choices, pointing specifically to those emerging 
from regulatory design, individual, and community contexts.  
Because the IAD framework offers limited theoretical guidance about the relationship 
between these types of variables, however, regulatory and IAD scholarship are applied in 
conjunction herein to gain a thorough depiction of factors that shape decision making regarding 
compliance and the expected directionality of this influence (i.e., positive or negative influence on 
compliance). In particular, this analysis will explore the influence of two sets of motivations on 
compliance: regulatory-based motivations (e.g., characteristics regulatory design and monitoring and 
enforcement) and individual and community based motivations (e.g., feelings of guilt associated with 
non-compliance or compliance based on social reputational concerns). The following discussion 
highlights the specific variables that will be examined in each of these two categories of factors 
based on past empirical research, and offers propositions relating each to compliance.  
Regulatory Scholarship 
 Early research on compliance was steeped in the belief that a fear of penalty or punishment 
was a primary compliance motivator (Bentham, 1789) and relied heavily on the regulatory deterrence 
model (Becker, 1968). This model is premised upon the assumption that legal sanctions suffice to 
thwart the desire for non-compliance on the part of regulated actors. Consistent with the rational 
actor model of the individual, regulated actors from this perspective are considered self-utility 
maximizing agents in which the incentive to accumulate profit, or conversely, to not bear excessive 
costs, is the sole motivator guiding individuals’ decision making processes. As such, monetary 
sanctions administered through regulatory agencies are viewed as the primary coercive mechanism 
for fostering regulatory compliance (Becker, 1968; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).  
Increasingly, empirical research in the regulatory field has drawn upon scholarship from 
sociology and social psychology to demonstrate that a variety of other factors stemming from 
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individual and community contexts contribute to regulatees’ decisions regarding when to comply 
with regulatory directives apart from monetary considerations (Elster, 1989a; Elster, 1989b; 
Coleman, 1990; Ajzen, 1988). Such factors include social sanctions and influence (Hatcher et al., 
2003; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999), feelings of shame or guilt (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990), and the 
extent to which individuals express a moral obligation to comply with the law (Hatcher et al., 2000; 
Gezelius, 2003, Kuperan and Sutinen, 1995). Hatcher et al. (2000), for example, found that social 
pressures served as an effective deterrent to non-compliance relating to catch quotas, or individual 
fishing quotas, in the United Kingdom. Similarly, Kuperan and Sutinen (1995) have explored the 
relationship between compliance and feelings of moral obligation among regulatees regarding fishery 
zoning regulations in Malaysia.  
Looking to other motivating factors, scholars have also examined a host of variables specific 
to a particular regulatory context, including: enforcement practices, specifically frequency of 
inspections (Burby and Paterson, 1993; Gray and Scholz, 1993; Helland, 1998; May, 2005), belief 
congruency between regulators and regulatees regarding the way the industry should be managed 
(May, 2005; Bardach and Kagan, 1982), technical competence of the regulatory agency as perceived 
by members of the industry (Bardach and Kagan, 1982), and the presence of trust between the two 
actors (Scholz and Lubell, 1998).   Of these, an important factor that will be analyzed in this paper is 
the extent to which regulatees feel that those enforcing regulations are competent or knowledgeable 
(Bardach and Kagan, 1982) as this has not been studied as widely as the other aforementioned 
factors. Where they are not, regulatees may question the legitimacy of rules or the ability of 
enforcement personnel to administer those rules (Gunningham et al. 2005).   
Another vein of regulatory scholarship based in a more socio-legal tradition focuses on the 
relationship between regulatory content and compliance (Gezelius, 2003; Hart, 1997). In what he 
terms “legitimacy of the law,” Gezelius (2003) builds upon the work of Hart (1997) to explore the 
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relationship between “formal norms” and “informal norms” and the implications of this relationship 
on compliance. Gezelius and Hart define “formal norms” as the government created laws that 
“require people to act in certain ways or abstain from certain actions” (Hart, 1997, 81). In contrast, 
“informal norms” are norms guiding behavior that emerge from “citizens’ inter-subjective 
experience,” independent of externally imposed laws or regulations. Legal legitimacy, according to 
Gezelius, is the extent to which formal and informal norms are consistent and is a factor shaping 
individual compliance. A paucity of research in this area by regulatory scholars may be supplemented 
by IAD research wherein formal and informal norms have been extensively studied. Using an IAD 
lens to understand regulatory compliance can shed additional light on the role of formal and 
informal norms, or rules, in collective action situations (Ostrom, 1990; 2005).  
The preceding discussion illustrates that compliance is heterogeneously motivated by factors 
relating to regulatory design, regulatory mechanisms (i.e., enforcement), as well as, normative 
considerations derived from actors’ individual and community experiences. However, many 
regulatory studies focus on variables belonging to one of these types of factors. Part of the reason 
for this may be that regulatory scholars have not yet identified theories of compliance that allow for 
the simultaneous consideration of diverse compliance motivations. The following section outlines 
one integrative approach that can be applied toward this endeavor.  
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
The institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework is used in this paper to 
organize a study of compliance motivations. The IAD framework provides a structured approach 
for understanding, first, the rules individual develop to govern behavior, and second, what factors 
affect how individuals respond to these rules. Under the framework it is presumed that when 
confronted with a behavioral choice in a rule-governed context, boundedly rational actors will be 
influenced by (1) the structure of opportunities and constraints established in, and associated with, 
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formal and/or informal rules; (2) patterns of interaction between individuals being governed by and 
those monitoring and enforcing rules; and (3) individuals’ psychological valuations of intrinsic and 
extrinsically derived motivations.  
As frameworks are meant to identify general relationships between classes of variables rather 
than generating specific predictions about the expected patterns of these relationships (Ostrom, 
2005,28), propositions offered in this paper regarding compliance motivations draw primarily from 
applications of Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory, housed within the IAD framework, as well as 
upon empirical  regulatory studies. Under the IAD framework, rules are understood to be generated 
by actors within a specific context to structure their behaviors and participant roles and 
responsibilities. Ostrom et al. (1994) write that, “Rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to 
achieve order and predictability among humans by creating classes of persons (positions) who are 
then required, permitted, or forbidden to take classes of actions in relation to required, permitted, or 
forbidden states of the world” (Ostrom et al., 1994, 38). Compliance within the setting of the IAD 
framework is characterized as conformance with rules and is shaped by both individuals’ normative 
and material considerations (Ostrom, 2005, 167) emerging from biophysical, community, and 
individual contexts. Compliance has been an important consideration for IAD scholars, particularly 
those applying CPR theory, to understand how communities develop rules so as to promote the 
successful management of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990).  
The IAD framework offers a useful analytical platform upon which to extend a discussion of 
the interplay between formal and informal norms as highlighted in the regulatory literature 
(Gezelius, 2003; Hart, 1997).  Under the framework, rules codified into written documents such as 
policies, laws, or regulations are characterized as "rules-in-form." Rules-in-form are distinct from 
"rules-in-use," which are codified in social norms and customs. Rules-in-use may or may not be 
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embodied in rules-in-form2. The extent to which they are, however, may enhance their perceived 
legitimacy (Ostrom, 2005) as found by scholars applying the IAD’s CPR theory and Gezelius (2003). 
In other words, rules-in-form that reflect community or industry norms are expected to be better 
received by regulatees than those that are not. Where regulating and regulated actors possess 
disparate beliefs regarding how an industry should be managed, scholars argue that regulated agents 
may question the legitimacy of regulatory agents as well as the legitimacy and fairness of the 
directives themselves (Gezelius, 2003; May, 2005; Ostrom, 1990). This, in turn, may negatively 
impact compliance levels (May, 2005, 321; Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Levi, 1988).   
According to CPR theory, consistency between rules-in-form and rules-in-use may be partly 
informed by the degree to which those being governed by a set of rules are participants in the rule 
development process (Ostrom, 1990) or the extent to which they regularly communicate with those 
charged with developing rules. Regulatory scholars Braithwaite et al. (2007) suggest that frequent 
communication between regulators and regulatees reduces the social distance between the two types 
of actors, thereby increasing the likelihood of compliance. According to Braithwaite et al., “In the 
regulatory context, social distance is a useful concept to explain the ways in which individuals place 
themselves beyond the reach and influence of an authority, so that they do not understand or hear 
the demands, and they do not fear the consequences of non-compliance” (Braithwaite et al., 2007, 
138).     
                                                          
2 “Rules-in-form” and “rules-in-use” may also be characterized as “institutions-in-form” and “institutions-in-use.” At the 
broadest level, prescriptions for governing behavior within the IAD framework are characterized as “institutions,” where 
these are defined as the “prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” 
(Ostrom, 2005, 3) Institutions are then characterized as rules, norms, or strategies based on the degree of enforcement 
and sanctioning specified within them for non-compliant behavior (Ostrom, 2005; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). 
Irrespective of this distinction, however, IAD scholars often use the phrases “rules-in-form” and “rules-in-use” in 
discussing what would be perhaps more technically appropriate to refer to as “institutions-in-form” and “institutions-in-
use.” 
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A related factor highlighted in CPR applications as being an influential compliance 
determinant is the perceived appropriateness of rule (e.g., regulatory) scope, particularly in relation 
to local resource, political, and social conditions (Ostrom, 1990; 2005). Ostrom (1990) proffers that 
rules that are well-tailored to the context in which they are being applied contribute to the long term 
sustainability of such resources (Ostrom, 1990, 92). In exploring this issue within a fisheries context, 
Jentoft (2004) asserts that when fishers lose the ability to feel morally committed to “values such as 
honesty and respect for rules" (Jentoft, 2004, 144), the ascendancy of regulatory over regulated 
agents begins to diminish, thereby increasing chances of non-compliance by the latter. In the case of 
this paper, regulatory scope appropriateness is understood specifically in terms of the extent to 
which regulations accurately represent the array of activities that regulatees are involved in on a daily 
basis. 
Another important dimension of rules is the way in which they are monitored and enforced. 
As Ostrom states, “It is obvious to most institutional analysts that rules must be enforced in some 
manner to achieve robust governance” (Ostrom, 2005, 265). In general, the IAD framework makes 
the case of context appropriateness; just as rules that are crafted in accordance with local resource, 
political, and social conditions are expected to foster compliance, so too are monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms that reflect sensitivity to the rule-governed context. In CPR studies, this 
sensitivity has been operationalized as the inclusion of local regulatees in monitoring and 
enforcement efforts (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe, 2000). Presumably, local regulatees possess 
both the tacit and rule-based knowledge necessary for effective monitoring and enforcement.  
Finally, consistent with mental model debates in the regulatory scholarship, Crawford and 
Ostrom (1995; 2005) sought to examine the relative influence of intrinsic and extrinsically derived 
motivations on individuals’ decision making calculus concerning compliance within the purview of 
the IAD framework. Consistent with the underpinnings of the framework, Crawford and Ostrom 
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challenged rational choice institutional models that view actors as exhibiting static preferences and 
behavior solely as a product of externally provided constraints, information, and outcome 
possibilities, while neglecting socially, or community, derived motivations (McCay, 2002; Shepsle, 
2006, 24-25). Instead, they argued that material and non-material rewards all factor into individuals’ 
decision making processes. To demonstrate this tendency, they called for the analytical juxtaposition 
of factors based on material (e.g., fear of facing financial penalties) and non-material rewards and 
sanctions (e.g., feelings of guilt and fear of social disapproval associated with non-compliance). In 
furthering the analysis of these variables within the analytical context of the IAD framework, Speer 
(2010) examined the relative influence of a fear of financial penalties, fear of social disapproval, and 
feelings of guilt in influencing compliance among local government actors within the case of 
participatory governance arrangements in Guatemalan municipalities. She found that social 
enforcement of the law by members of civil society was necessary for local government compliance. 
Individual and community based compliance motivations such as those discussed here are consistent 
between the IAD and regulatory literatures as both consider the influence of the fear of monetary 
sanctions, peer pressure, and feelings of personal guilt or shame in influencing compliance outcomes 
(Frey, 1994; Bendor and Mookherjee, 1990; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Sutinen and Kueperan, 
1999; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990) 
The discussion presented up to this point is meant to demonstrate the multi-dimensional 
nature of compliance. Compliance is at least tied to factors relating to regulatory design, interactions 
between regulatory and regulated agents, and individual and community contexts. Based on this 
observation, it is argued that the IAD framework is an appropriate umbrella lens for assessing 
compliance as it designed to support an examination of individual and collective behavior within 
rule-governed contexts. The framework includes classes of variables that correspond to the major 
categories of factors found by regulatory scholars to affect compliance. Further, the tenets of the 
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framework are consistent with developments in compliance research, whereby scholars have 
increasingly come to acknowledge the influence of normatively-oriented factors.  
Propositions 
 Building on past regulatory and IAD scholarship, the following eight compliance 
motivations will be examined in this paper. It is expected that each of these factors is positively 
associated with compliance: (1) the extent to which individuals feel that those enforcing regulations 
are knowledgeable; (2) the extent to which individuals feel that that regulations accurately reflect the 
scope of activities that they are engaged in on a daily basis; (3) whether or not regulations are 
perceived as being consistent with industry  best practices; (4) whether or not individuals regularly 
communicate with members of regulating agencies concerning regulatory matters; (5) a fear of 
financial penalties; (6) a desire to maintain a good reputation with other industry members; (7) 
feelings of guilt associated with non-compliance; and (8) a strong moral obligation to produce a 
good product. The first four of these motivations are characterized as "regulatory based compliance 
motivations" as they pertain to features of the regulatory context, such as regulatory enforcement 
personnel and regulatory design. The latter four variables are characterized as "individual and 
community based motivations" as they are grounded in individuals' unique compliance 
considerations based on their individual and the community contexts. Table 1 summarizes 
propositions that are posited in this paper in relation to each of the aforementioned motivations and 
also specifies how these are characterized (i.e., regulatory or individual or community based).  
Table 1 Here 
Study Setting: Aquaculture in Florida 
This assessment of factors contributing to compliance with state level aquaculture 
regulations was conducted in the State of Florida. The selection of Florida as an appropriate case 
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study to pursue this endeavor was based on data collected through a national study of members of 
the National Association of State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) (survey n=32; interview 
n=10; survey response rate = 57%; states represented in study sample = 30).  The purpose of the 
NASAC study was to collect information on the regulatory landscapes of aquaculture producing 
states, including, characteristics of state regulations (e.g. regulatory stringency), state regulatory 
mechanisms (e.g., arrangements for enforcement), compliance behavior (e.g., levels of regulatory 
compliance with state level regulations), and industry dynamics (e.g., extent of peer monitoring and 
enforcement among industry members). 
 The primary variable used for case selection purposes was farmer compliance with 
regulations. In the NASAC study regulatory compliance among Florida aquaculture producers was 
reportedly very high.3 In relation to the overall findings of the NASAC study, this makes Florida a 
typical case (Gerring, 2007). More than 70% of study respondents agreed that compliance with 
aquaculture regulations in their respective state is very high (Siddiki and Weible, 2010).At least with 
respect to compliance, the fact that it represents a typical case makes the findings from this single 
case study more amenable to generalization than if an outlier case study were examined.   
                                                          
3 Florida was selected as part of a comparative most-similar case study design in which two states were to be compared 
in a follow-up study assessing compliance factors (the results of which are presented in this paper). The two states 
selected were Florida and Virginia. Based on the NASAC data, these two states were reportedly similar in a number of 
regulatory and industry characteristics, but differed in terms of levels of regulatory stringency. Differentiating Florida 
and Virginia was that Florida was reported as having very stringent regulations while Virginia was reported to have non-
stringent regulations. In pursuing this type of most-similar design, the author was interested in determining what factors 
contribute to reportedly high levels of regulatory compliance when regulatory designs apparently offer diverse incentives 
to comply. In states with stringent regulations and high compliance, i.e. in which regulations contain severe penalties for 
cases of non-compliance, the regulations themselves may provide sufficient incentive to comply. However, in states with 
non-stringent regulations and high compliance, there may be additional incentives motivating individuals’ decision to 
comply. Further, both regulatory and IAD scholarship suggest that additional factors beyond those relating to policy 
design are influential in shaping individuals’ compliance behavior. Given data limitations, only Florida is explored in this 
paper. Survey response rates for Virginia in the follow-up regulatory compliance study were too low to pursue a 
comparative analysis. Further inquiry into the reasons behind the low response rate revealed that the author’s survey was 
administered in near temporal proximity to others possibly contributing to surveyee fatigue and/or confusion about the 
intent of this survey in comparison to others administered around the same time. Nevertheless, Florida offers a 
theoretically useful appropriate case in which to study regulatory compliance. 
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In a broader context, Florida has supported an active finfish, shellfish, and ornamental fish 
industry, though, until recently, it was best known for shellfish production.  The state has abundant 
water sources between the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts to support the development of aquaculture, 
though current leasing and citing policies may limit the availability and access to such resources. The 
state has actively expressed support for the development of aquaculture, touting benefits to 
ecosystem diversity and preservation of wild fish stocks. Manifestations of this support include the 
implementation of work transition programs, which provide training for commercial fishermen 
interested in entering the aquaculture industry, as well as aquaculture subsidy programs which 
provide individuals the opportunity to start up aquaculture operations at a reduced cost. In such 
programs, new industry entrants may obtain aquaculture leases within designated Aquaculture 
Opportunity Zones (AOZs) at subsidized costs. 
 The state has well-developed regulations for governing aquaculture.  In Florida, the Division 
of Aquaculture (FDACS) was established in 1999 within the Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services for the purposes of developing, implementing, and enforcing aquaculture 
regulations. The primary document governing the practice of aquaculture in Florida is a 
comprehensive rule known as the, “Florida Aquaculture Best Management Practices (BMPs) Rule.” 
This Rule contains regulations pertaining to all aspects of aquaculture production, including facility 
design specifications, water use and conservation techniques, administrative reporting requirements, 
and allowable and restricted species.  
 As a case study, Florida is theoretically appropriate given the objective of studying 
compliance motivations considering that it has a well-developed regulatory system and that the 
industry has been around long enough to develop social and industry norms surrounding the 
practice of aquaculture. As such, it provides an appropriate case within with to analyze in 
juxtaposition the effect of motivations stemming from the regulatory and social environment.  
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Methods of Data Acquisition 
 This analysis is based on original interview and questionnaire data. As a first step in the data 
acquisition process, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 members of the Florida 
aquaculture community.  This sample of interview participants was identified through a modified 
snowball sampling technique and included five shellfish aquaculture producers, two ornamental fish 
producers, two ornamental fish processor and handlers, one producer of shellfish and finfish, and 
five regulatory officials and/or enforcement personnel.  A list of potential interview participants was 
identified based upon conversations with aquaculture stakeholders (e.g., aquaculture producers and 
representatives from the FDACS) as well as through a list provided by a regulatory official from the 
FDACS. This regulatory official randomly selected names of potential participants based on 
geographic region; that is, it was evident that individuals were not selected based on their regulatory 
standing (i.e., compliance behavior). This was ascertained by the author as aquaculture producers 
expressed varying degrees of familiarity with FDACS regulatory personnel.  While representing only 
a small percentage of the total population of aquaculture producers in the State (15 out of 415 
registered producers), this sample was comprised of individuals reflecting each of the major actor 
categories within the aquaculture community.   
 Interview participants were asked to comment specifically on (1) the extent to which they 
feel that regulations accurately represent the scope of activities that they are involved with on a daily 
basis; and (2) to comment on whether a fear of financial penalties, a desire to maintain a good 
reputation with other members of the industry, or personal feelings of guilt associated with non-
compliance was most influential in shaping their decisions to comply with regulatory directives.  
Additional questions posed in the interviews were meant to capture a broader understanding of 
interviewees' perceptions relating to the aquaculture regulatory context in Florida.  For example, 
interviewees were asked whether they feel regulations should be more or less stringent, the general 
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level of compliance with regulations, and overall perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of 
current state level regulations.  
 Following the completion of the interviews, an online questionnaire was developed using 
data obtained through the interviews.  This was done foremost as an attempt to ensure that the 
survey appropriately reflected the regulatory context surrounding aquaculture in Florida. The 
questionnaire was more sharply crafted than the interview protocol to capture data pertaining to 
each of the compliance motivations under consideration in this paper, in addition to containing 
questions relating to the broader regulatory context.  
 The online questionnaire was administered in the spring and summer of 2011 to 415 
aquaculture producers in Florida State. These 415 producers represent the entire population of 
aquaculture farmers in Florida registered and licensed with current email addresses under the 
FDACS to practice aquaculture. The email addresses of these individuals were provided to the 
author by a FDACS regulatory official. Of the 415 aquaculture producers to whom the survey was 
sent, 78 responded yielding a 19% response rate. The respondent sample included 23 finfish 
producers, 17 ornamental fish producers, 12 aquaculture processor or handlers, 10 shellfish 
aquaculture producers, 3 individuals who are both aquaculture processor or handlers and shellfish 
producers, 2 individuals who are both aquaculture processor or handlers and finfish producers, 1 
ornamental and finfish producer, 1 aquaculture processor or handler and alligator producer, and 9 
individuals involved in miscellaneous aspects of aquaculture (e.g., live rock, experimental 
aquaculture, etc.). Though the sample was limited, the respondents appropriately reflect the range of 
aquaculture participants in the Florida industry which is comprised predominantly of shellfish, 
finfish, and ornamental fish producers (UDSA, 2006).  
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Data Analyses 
 Questionnaire and interview data were analyzed in conjunction to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of compliance motivations, unattainable from analyzing one type of 
data alone.  Whereas the qualitative analysis allowed for the opportunity to discern the nuances 
informing the relationship between compliance motivations among individual producers, the 
quantitative analysis allowed for a more direct assessment of the relationship between regulatory 
based and individual and community based motivations and compliance based on a larger sample.   
 Interview data were analyzed by collating responses to the relevant questions from the 
interview protocol and identifying trends in responses. Survey data were analyzed using bivariate and 
multivariate analyses based on responses to questions asking survey respondents to identify the 
extent to which they feel regulatory enforcement  personnel are knowledgeable about aquaculture 
(Independent Variable or IV1); perceived regulatory appropriateness (IV2); the extent to which 
regulations are perceived as being consistent with industry level best business practices (IV3); 
whether or not respondents regularly communicate with regulating agencies to discuss aquaculture 
regulations(IV4); the extent to which a fear of financial penalties (IV5); a desire to maintain a good 
reputation with other industry members (IV6); feelings of guilt associated with non-compliance (IV7); 
and a moral obligation to produce a good product (IV8)  are important to respondents in making 
compliance decisions, and levels of compliance (DV1). Each of these variables was treated as 
independent variables, except for level of compliance, which was the dependent variable. Each of 
these independent and dependent variables was operationalized in the questionnaire as described in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 Here 
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 Given that the variables under consideration are all ordinal, for the bivariate analysis, 
Kendall's Tau correlations were conducted to determine if statistically significant relationships exist 
between each of the independent variables and dependent variable of interest.  For the multivariate 
analyses, ordered logistic regressions were conducted to determine if the independent variables were 
significant predictors of compliance.4 No more than four predictor variables were included in each 
regression analysis, given that the total number of observations included in the regressions ranged 
from 54 to 55. The number of predictors selected for the models was based on the recommendation 
that the sample size should be at least 10 times the number of predictors in logistic regression 
analyses (Harrel et al. 1985; Peduzzi et al., 1996; Van Belle, 2002).5 Also motivated by the small 
sample size, two models were conducted in which two sets of four predictor variables were 
considered (one set including regulatory based compliance motivations and one set including 
individual and community based motivations) along with one final model that examined the best 
predictors from these in relation to compliance. Each ordered logistical regression was conducted 
using the robust command in the statistical software program, Stata 10.1.  
Results 
 
                                                          
4 To determine if the data were normally distributed, skewness statistics were calculated for each of the independent 
variables and dependent variables included in the analysis. Results from this analysis revealed that the following variables 
exceed the acceptable skewness values of +1/-1 (Leech et al. 2007): Compliance motivation: face financial penalties, 
(skewness value: -1.41), compliance motivation (skewness value: -1.37), moral obligation to produce a good product 
(skewness value: -2.92), compliance (skewness value: -1.90). Because each of the variables under consideration is ordinal, 
transformation of the data to correct for non-normality was not conducted. The author opted instead to conduct non-
parametric statistical techniques. 
5 It has been cautioned that logistic regression tends to overestimate odds ratios or beta coefficients when dealing with 
smaller samples. However, the author feels for two reasons that the use of logistic regression with the small size does not 
pose any serious threats in the analysis: First, overestimation does not pose any relevant threats in single studies. Rather, 
this overestimation becomes an issue when several small studies with overestimated effects are combined without due 
consideration of the exaggerated effects (Nemes et al., 2009). Second, the author is foremost interested in the 
significance of the relationship and secondarily with the size of the coefficients.   
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 A review of results from the interviews will first be discussed, followed by a discussion of 
results from the analyses of questionnaire data.  
Interview Results 
 
 Interview participants were asked to comment specifically on the extent to which they feel 
that regulations accurately represent the scope of activities that they are involved with on a daily 
basis (Interview Question: “In the regulations, you are/are not listed in relation to many activities, 
such as x, y, z. How do you think this reflects the scope of activities that you are involved in on a 
daily basis?”). In response to this question, 13 out of 15 interviewees indicated that regulations are 
broad enough in scope to account for their daily activities. One aquaculture producer, commenting 
on both the scope of regulations as well on the extent to which they are consistent with industry 
best practices, stated, "Regulations cover every aspect of what producers are involved with when it 
comes to aquaculture; but a lot of it, such as disease management, is stuff that producers would do 
anyway" (Interviewee ID: 018). Another producer commented on the scope of regulations, the 
knowledge of enforcement personnel, social disapproval of non-compliant behavior, and the 
relationship between regulations and industry best practices, saying, "The regulations cover the 
gamut of what producers do on a daily basis when it comes to their aquaculture operations. DACS 
representatives are intimately acquainted with aquaculture. If someone is flagrantly negligent of 
regulations, the whole aquaculture community frowns upon that. That which is included in the 
BMPs is really the best thing to do for your business and operation" (Interviewee ID: 019).  
 Interview participants were also asked to comment on whether a fear of financial penalties, a 
desire to maintain a good reputation with other members of the industry, or feelings of guilt was 
most influential in shaping their decisions to comply with regulatory directives (Interview Question: 
“If you had to weight a fear of monetary sanctions or penalties, a desire to maintain a good 
reputation with other industry members, and feelings of guilt from not complying with regulations, 
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which would you say is the most important in influencing your compliance decisions?”). Twelve out 
of 15 interviewees responded to this question. Some interviewees explicitly weighted these 
motivations in relation to one another, while others provided varying responses based upon their 
interpretation of the question. In the case of the latter, interviewees stated the motivation(s) most 
influential for them beyond the three that the author explicitly inquired about. Table 3 provides a 
breakdown of interviewee responses.  With respect to the aforementioned compliance motivations, 
a desire to maintain a good reputation with industry members and feelings of guilt associated with 
non-compliance6 were cited more often than a fear of financial penalties as a primary compliance 
motivation. Regarding reputational concerns, one producer commented, "Reputation is everything. 
People in the community know each other and there is a concern regarding integrity and character" 
(Interviewee ID: 018). This same interviewee said about guilt being a primary compliance motivator, 
"Guilt is also important. I have to live with myself."  Another interviewee commented about 
reputation, "Industry is kind of like a club. If you know someone is not doing what they are 
supposed to -- others will turn on you. This is because someone's bad practice impacts the whole 
industry" (Interviewee ID: 025).  Reputation and guilt were cited as primary compliance motivators 
by each type of actor included in the interview sample (i.e. regulators, aquaculture producers, and 
processor/handlers). 
Table 3 Here 
                                                          
6 In many cases, interviewees cited "a desire to do what is right" as a compliance motivation. In Table 2, this was coded 
as feelings of guilt and this response implies that individuals are morally concerned with complying with regulations.  
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These interview findings provide some qualitative insight into the regulatory context of 
aquaculture in Florida. The results indicate that regulations are largely perceived as appropriately 
reflecting the scope of activities in which members of the aquaculture community are regularly 
engaged. Further, the results indicate that a desire to maintain a good reputation with fellow industry 
members and feelings of guilt associated with non-compliance are both important compliance 
considerations among members of the aquaculture community. They also show, that when asked to 
weight the relative influence of these factors alongside a fear of financial penalties, the former tend 
to be more influential.  
 While this qualitative insight is useful in understanding contextual elements of the regulatory 
environment in terms of a few variables, a more complete analysis of each of the compliance 
motivations examined in this paper was conducted using quantitative data obtained through the 
online questionnaire, the results of which are presented next. 
Questionnaire Results: Bivariate Analysis  
 First, bivariate analyses were conducted to determine whether or not the independent 
variables of interest were significantly correlated with the dependent variable. The results from these 
analyses are provided in Table 4. In support of the posited propositions, each of the regulatory 
based motivations (‘knowledgeable enforcement personnel,’ ‘appropriate regulatory scope,’ 
‘regulations consistent with industry best practices,’ and ‘farmer regularly communicates with 
regulating agencies’) and individual and community based motivations (‘fear of facing financial 
penalties,’ ‘desire to maintain good reputation with industry members,’ ‘guilt,’ and ‘moral obligation 
to produce a good product’) under consideration were found to be significantly and positively 
correlated with compliance, except for ‘farmer regularly communicates with regulating agencies’ and 
‘moral obligation to produce a good product.’  
Table 4 Here 
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Questionnaire Results: Multivariate Analyses 
 
 Building on the results of the bivariate analysis, ordered logistic regression analyses were 
conducted to assess the relationship between the various compliance motivations and compliance 
when modeled alongside one another. These results are displayed in Tables 5, 6, and 7. The first 
table displays results from an analysis of regulatory based compliance motivations; the second from 
an analysis of individual and community based compliance motivations; and the third from an 
analysis that examines the significant predictors from the other two models alongside each other. 
The tables display the ordered log odds regression coefficients and associated odds ratios, robust 
standard errors, number of observations included in the model, and the model’s McFadden’s Pseudo 
R2, Wald Chi2 statistic, and overall model significance (Prob > chi2). 
 Table 5 contains the results of the first model to examine regulatory based compliance 
motivations. The results indicate that the model as a whole is significant at the .01 level (95% 
confidence interval) according to the model’s Wald Chi2 statistic equal to 13.30. The model has a 
Pseudo R2 equal to 19%. Of all the independent variables included in the model, the coefficient for 
‘knowledgeable enforcement personnel’ was significant at the .01 level (95% confidence interval). 
The interpretation of this result is that for a one unit increase in ‘knowledgeable enforcement 
personnel’ (i.e., going from 0 to 1 or “somewhat agree to totally agree”), there is an expected 
increase of .68 in the log odds of being in a higher level of comply (i.e., “neither agree nor disagree” 
to “partially agree” or “partially agree” to “totally agree”), given all of the other variables in the 
model are held constant. However, because log odds are difficult to interpret, the odds ratios 
relating to each of these coefficients were also calculated (odds ratios were calculated by 
exponentiating the coefficient, ecoef). Odds ratios are easier to interpret as they indicate the 
proportional likelihood of being at a higher level in the dependent variable based on a one unit 
increase in the predictor variable. So, for example, for ‘knowledgeable enforcement personnel,’ the 
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odds ratio calculation demonstrates that for a one unit increase in this variable, the odds of a higher 
level of compliance are 1.98 times greater, given the other variables are held constant.  
Table 5 Here 
 Model 2, the results of which are displayed in Table 6, examines individual and community 
based motivations in relation to compliance. The results indicate that this model too is significant at 
the .01 level (95% confidence interval) according to the model’s Wald Chi2 statistic equal to 15.40. 
The model has a Pseduo R2 equal to 14%. Of all the independent variables included in the model, 
the coefficients for ‘desire to maintain a good reputation with industry members’ and ‘guilt’ were 
found to be significant at the .05 level (95% confidence interval). For the former, a one unit increase 
in ‘desire to maintain a good reputation with industry members,’ is associated with a .58 increase in 
the log odds of being in a higher level of compliance, corresponding to an odds ratio of 1.79, given 
that all of the other variables in the model are held constant. For the latter, for a one unit increase in 
‘guilt,’ we expect to see a .44 increase in the log odds of being in a higher level of compliance, 
corresponding to an odds ratio of 1.55, holding all other variables constant.  
 
Table 6 Here 
 A third model assessed only those variables whose coefficients were found to be significant 
in Models 1 and 2 in relation to compliance: ‘knowledgeable enforcement personnel,’ ‘desire to 
maintain a good reputation with industry members, and ‘guilt.’ The results from this analysis are 
provided in Table 7. Model 3 was the strongest of three regression models; significant at the .01 level 
(95% confidence interval) according to the model’s Wald Chi2 statistic equal to 25.47. The model has 
a Pseduo R2 equal to 30%. The coefficients of all three independent variables included in the analysis 
were found to be significant, with ‘knowledgeable enforcement personnel’ and ‘desire to maintain a 
good reputation with industry members’ significant at the .01 level (95% confidence interval) and 
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‘guilt’ significant at the .05 level (95% confidence interval). Based on the results, for a one unit 
increase in ‘knowledgeable enforcement personnel,’ there is an expected increase of 1.09 in the log 
odds of being in a higher level of compliance, corresponding to an odds ratio of 2.96, for a one unit 
increase in ‘desire to maintain a good reputation with industry members,’ there is an expected 
increase of .79 in the log odds of being in a higher level of compliance, corresponding to an odds 
ratio of 2.21, and for a one unit increase in ‘guilt,’ there is an expected increase of .57 in the log odds 
of being in a higher level of compliance, corresponding to an odds ratio of 1.77, given all of the 
other variables in the model are held constant.  
Table 7 Here 
 To further ascertain the robustness of the significance of these variables in relation to the all 
of the independent variables tested, different combinations of regulatory based and individual and 
community based motivations were analyzed together in separate logit models (the results of which 
can be found in Appendix A). This was done in an effort to determine if modeling different 
combinations of regulatory and individual and community based factors together would impact 
which predictors were showing up as significant. These additional tests demonstrate that the 
coefficients for 'knowledgeable aquaculture personnel,’ 'desire to maintain a positive reputation with 
industry members,' and 'guilt' remain significant even when these variables are modeled with 
different combinations of variables.7 As an additional attempt to demonstrate the robustness of the 
                                                          
7 Combination 1: Desire to maintain a good reputation with industry, appropriate regulatory scope, regulations 
consistent with industry best practices, and farmer regularly communicates with regulating agencies.  
 Combination 2: Guilt, appropriate regulatory scope, regulations consistent with industry best practices, and farmer 
regularly communicates with regulating agencies. 
Combination 3: Knowledgeable enforcement personnel, fear of facing financial penalties, and moral obligation to 
produce a good product.  
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significance of these variables, two ordinary least square regression models were conducted assessing 
the relationship between regulatory based motivations and compliance (multiple regression Model 1) 
and individual and community based motivations and compliance (multiple regression Model 2) 
(results for these analyses can be found in Appendix B).  Both models were significant at the .05 
level with adjusted R2 values of 33% (model 1) and 29% (model 2). In model 1, 'knowledgeable 
enforcement personnel' was significant. In model 2, 'desire to maintain a good reputation with 
industry members' was the only significant variable. Multicollinearity diagnostics conducted along 
with these models demonstrate a lack of muticollinearity between the predictor variables under 
consideration.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This paper explores factors motivating regulatory compliance. This issue was examined in 
the context of aquaculture in the State of Florida. The IAD framework was applied as a means to 
organize an inquiry of compliance motivations found to be influential in past regulatory and IAD 
scholarship. The IAD framework is designed to assist in the systematic investigation of behavior in 
rule-governed contexts, specifically highlighting the influence of individual and community based 
factors. Given the diversity of variables found by regulatory scholars to shape compliance, and a 
resultant inability to identify a theory of regulatory compliance to guide an examination of 
compliance motivations, an analytical lens is useful that can at least identify classes of variables that 
should be jointly assessed in such an investigation. The IAD framework is a particularly applicable 
analytical approach in light of recent regulatory scholarship that emphasizes the role of normatively-
oriented compliance motivations stemming from actors’ individual and community contexts, while 
also explicitly drawing upon the relationship between formal and informal rules.  
 The influence of eight different motivations on compliance was examined using a mixed-
method approach.  The first set of motivations analyzed were characterized as regulatory based, and 
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include: ‘the extent to which individuals feel regulatory enforcement personnel are knowledgeable 
about aquaculture,’ ‘perceived regulatory appropriateness,’ ‘the extent to which regulations are 
perceived as being consistent with industry level best business practices,’ and ‘whether or not 
individuals regularly communicate with members of regulating agencies to discuss aquaculture 
regulations.’ The second set of motivations analyzed were characterized as being individual or 
community based, and include: ‘a fear of financial penalties,’ ‘a desire to maintain a good reputation 
with other industry members,’ ‘feelings of guilt associated with non-compliance,’ and ‘a moral 
obligation to produce a good product.’ Overall, the results of the analysis indicate that the following 
three factors are significant predictors of compliance: ‘perception by regulatees that those enforcing 
regulations are knowledgeable,’ ‘a desire to maintain a good reputation with other members of the 
industry,’ and ‘feelings of guilt associated with non-compliance.’  
 Interview and questionnaire data were analyzed conjunctively to arrive at these overall 
conclusions. Interview data provided a contextual understanding of the regulatory environment 
surrounding aquaculture in Florida, focusing on four factors, 'appropriateness of regulatory scope,' 
'fear of financial penalties,' 'a desire to maintain a good reputation with industry members,' and 
'feelings of guilt associated with non-compliance.' The interview question pertaining to the 
appropriateness of regulatory scope was meant primarily to capture a descriptive understanding of 
interviewees’ perceptions regarding this factor. The interview question pertaining to 'fear of financial 
penalties,' 'a desire to maintain a good reputation with industry members,' and 'feelings of guilt 
associated with non-compliance,' was designed to understand the relative influence of these factors 
in shaping interviewees' compliance decisions.  This question specifically asked interview 
participants to weight these three factors based on which is most influential to them when making 
compliance decisions. Interview findings indicate that the latter two of these motivations are 
important considerations for aquaculture community members when making compliance decisions 
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and that both are individually more influential than a fear of financial penalties. 
 Findings relating to the influence of individual and community based motivations on 
compliance were further corroborated through the analysis of questionnaire data in which, of the 
eight motivations examined, reputational concerns and guilt were found to be significant predictors 
of compliance, along with perceptions that enforcement personnel are knowledgeable about 
aquaculture.  This finding regarding the perceived competence of enforcement personnel as a 
significant predictor of compliance offers a contribution to the regulatory scholarship as few others 
have subjected this variable to empirical testing (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Gunningham et al. 
2005).   
 While these findings are supported by empirical research relating to the IAD framework and 
regulatory scholarship, it is difficult to say for certain why some factors were more important in the 
context of aquaculture in Florida than others. The fact that reputational concerns was a significant 
factor in this study context was expected given that the industry in Florida has had sufficient time to 
develop and that aquaculture producers have a proclivity to develop industry level best management 
practices. It is also unsurprising that guilt was a significant predictor given that non-compliance with 
regulations can have grave consequences, particularly relating to human health and the environment. 
Other findings were more unexpected. For example, why is it that perceived regulatory 
appropriateness was not found to be a significant predictor of compliance? Perhaps this is because 
Florida regulations are noted by aquaculturists, both in and outside of the state, as being especially 
broad in scope and thus there is not enough variability in the study populations' views regarding this 
factor to assess its influence in relation to compliance.  
 The primary limitation associated with the analysis is the small sample size. Providing a 
mixed-method analysis, employing both interview and questionnaire data, as well as conducting 
multiple statistical tests to demonstrate the robustness of significant variables does help to legitimate 
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the findings despite the sample size. Further, given that the online questionnaire was administered to 
the entire population of aquaculture producers in Florida, the vast majority of which the author had 
no previous contact with, a 19% response rate is considered respectable. 
The extent to which the findings are generalizable to a broader context is difficult to fully 
ascertain given that the study was based on the examination of a single case and the limited sample 
size. Again, the author sought to ameliorate the effect of these limitations by selecting a typical case 
within the aquaculture context and conducting a mixed-method analysis to triangulate and 
demonstrate the robustness of findings. Clearly, however, such a study should be replicated in 
additional states and in the context of different industries. The aquaculture industry is 
characteristically similar to other natural resource based industries in which regulations tend to be 
fairly technical, where decentralization of regulatory governance is commonly observed (May, 2005), 
and where there are complex interdependencies between among ecological, economic, technical, and 
social factors (Firestone et al., 2004).  As such, it is expected that the findings of this study regarding 
compliance motivations should be at least somewhat generalizable to other industry contexts, 
though this supposition must be subject to empirical testing.   
This paper lends credence to past research within the regulatory field and the IAD 
framework that outline a number of regulatory, individual, and community based motivations for 
affecting compliance. Through an application of the IAD framework, this paper adds to the 
compliance literature by highlighting one approach for a systematic and comprehensive examination 
of diverse compliance motivations. Such approaches are useful in the absence of clear theories of 
regulatory compliance that specify which variables should be excluded and included in 
comprehensive analyses of compliance motivations.  Through the application of this framework, this 
paper builds upon normatively oriented compliance studies that illuminate the role of variables such 
as guilt and social disapproval (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). Perhaps 
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more significantly, the framework is particularly well-suited for expanding upon regulatory 
scholarship dedicated to uncovering the interplay between formal and informal rules (Gezelius, 
2003). Understanding this relationship, in particular, is critical in any rule-governed context; both for 
discerning the motivations likely to be most influential within a particular context as well as for 
improving the efficacy and appropriateness of rules.   
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Tables 
Table 1. Propositions for Testing Compliance Motivations 
 
Compliance Motivation 
Related Proposition Vis-à-vis 
Compliance 
 
Compliance with regulatory 
directives will be higher when 
individuals… 
 
Type of Motivation 
Knowledgeable 
enforcement personnel 
…perceive that those 
enforcing them are 
knowledgeable. 
Regulatory based 
Appropriate regulatory 
scope 
…perceive that regulations 
accurately represent the scope 
of their daily activities. 
Regulatory based 
Regulations consistent 
with industry best 
practices 
…perceive them to be 
consistent with industry level 
best practices. 
Regulatory based 
Farmer regularly 
communicates with 
regulating agencies 
…regularly communicate with 
members of the regulating 
agency concerning regulatory 
matters. 
Regulatory based 
Fear of facing financial 
penalties 
…fear financial penalties from 
not complying. 
Individual or 
community based 
Desire to maintain a 
good reputation with 
industry members 
…fear that not complying will 
result in a negative reputation 
with fellow industry members. 
Individual or 
community based 
Guilt …feel a strong sense of guilt 
from not complying. 
Individual or 
community based 
Moral obligation to 
produce a good product 
…possess a strong moral 
obligation to produce a good 
product. 
Individual or 
community based 
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Table 2. Analytical Variables and Related Operationalizations in Questionnaire 
Variable 
Corresponding Question or Statement in 
Questionnaire 
Response Scale in 
Questionnaire 
(Corresponding 
Numeric Scale) 
DV: Compliance “I always comply with aquaculture 
regulations.” 
Totally disagree to 
totally agree  
(-2 to +2) 
IV1: Knowledgeable 
enforcement 
personnel 
“Those enforcing aquaculture regulations 
are knowledgeable about aquaculture.” 
Totally disagree to 
totally agree  
(-2 to +2) 
IV2: Appropriate 
regulatory scope 
“Aquaculture regulations reflect the full 
scope of activities that I am involved with 
at my facility on a daily basis.” 
Totally disagree to 
totally agree 
(-2 to +2) 
IV3: Regulations 
consistent with 
industry best 
practices 
“State regulations reflect the best business 
practices of the industry.” 
Totally disagree to 
totally agree 
(-2 to +2) 
IV4: Farmer regularly 
communicates 
with regulating 
agencies 
“In the last five years, I have regularly 
communicated with members of regulating 
agencies to discuss aquaculture 
regulations.” 
No/Yes 
(0/1) 
IV5: Fear of facing 
financial 
penalties 
“How important is the possibility of facing 
financial penalties to you when deciding 
whether or not to comply with 
regulations?” 
Not important at all 
to very important 
(0 to 4) 
IV6: Desire to 
maintain a good 
reputation with 
industry 
members 
“How important is maintaining a good 
reputation with other members of the 
industry to you when deciding whether or 
not to comply with regulations?” 
Not important at all 
to very important 
(0 to 4)  
IV7: Guilt “How important are personal feelings of 
guilt from not complying with state level 
regulations to you when deciding whether 
or not to comply with regulations?” 
Not important at all 
to very important 
(0 to 4) 
IV8: Moral obligation 
to produce a 
good product 
“How important is a moral obligation to 
produce a good product to you when 
deciding whether or not to comply with 
regulations?” 
Not important at all 
to very important 
(0 to 4) 
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Table 3. Breakdown of Interview Responses Regarding Compliance Motivations 
 
Interviewee ID Interviewee Type Primary Motivation(s) Secondary 
Motivation(s) 
012 Regulator Guilt - 
013 Regulator Needs the job, 
reputation, and protect 
natural environment 
- 
014 Ornamental 
processor/handler 
Reputation and guilt Fines 
015 Shellfish producer Fines and guilt Reputation 
016 Shellfish producer Guilt Fines 
018 Ornamental fish 
producer 
Reputation and guilt Fines 
019 Ornamental fish 
producer and 
processor/handler 
Reputation and guilt - 
020 Ornamental fish 
producer 
Reputation Fines 
022 Regulator Consistency in rule 
enforcement 
- 
023 Shellfish producer Following regulations 
is good for business 
- 
024 Shellfish producer Guilt Fines 
025 Shellfish producer Reputation - 
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Table 4. Kendall’s Tau Bivariate Correlations between Regulatory Based Compliance Motivations 
and Individual and Community Based Motivations and Compliance 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable:  
Compliance 
Knowledgeable enforcement personnel 
(n=55) 
.43** 
Appropriate regulatory scope (n=64) .46** 
Regulations consistent with industry best 
practices (n=64) 
.43** 
Farmer regularly communicates with 
regulating agencies (n=55) 
-.07 
Fear of facing financial penalties (n=58) .33** 
Desire to maintain good reputation with 
industry members (n=58) 
.33** 
Guilt (n=58) .37** 
Moral obligation to produce a good 
product (n=58) 
.18 
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5. Model 1: Ordered Logistic Regression for Regulatory Based Compliance Motivations and 
Compliance 
Independent Variables: Regulatory Based 
Compliance Motivations 
Dependent Variable: 
Compliance 
Ordered Log Odds 
Regression Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std.Error) 
Knowledgeable enforcement personnel .68** (.25) 1.98 (.55) 
Appropriate regulatory scope .50 (.37) 1.66 (.53) 
Regulations consistent with industry best 
practices 
.26 (.32) 1.30 (.42) 
Farmer regularly communicates with regulating 
agencies 
-.09 (.65) .91 (.61) 
Number of observations 54  
Pseduo R2 19%  
Wald Chi2/sig. 13.30/.010  
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6. Model 2: Ordered Logistic Regression for Individual and Community Based Motivations 
and Compliance 
 
Independent Variables: Individual and 
Community Based Motivations 
Dependent Variable: 
Compliance 
Ordered Log Odds 
Regression Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std.Error) 
Fear of facing financial penalties .26 (.27) 1.30 (.36) 
Desire to maintain good reputation 
with industry members 
.58* (.58) 1.79 (.55) 
Guilt .44* (.44) 1.55 (.37) 
Moral obligation to produce a good 
product 
 
-.07 (.42) .93 (.43) 
Number of observations 55  
Pseduo R2 14%  
Wald Chi2/sig. 15.40/.004  
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 7. Model 3: Ordered Logistic Regression for Significant Predictors from Models 1 and 2 and 
Compliance 
Independent Variables: 
Significant Predictors from 
Models 1 and 2 
Dependent Variable: 
Compliance 
Ordered Log Odds 
Regression Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std.Error) 
Knowledgeable enforcement 
personnel 
1.09** (.26) 2.96 (.86) 
Desire to maintain good 
reputation with industry 
members 
.79** (.26) 2.20 (.73) 
Guilt 
 
.57* (.24) 1.77 (.46) 
Number of observations 55  
Pseduo R2 30%  
(Table 5.7 Continued)   
Wald Chi2/sig. 25.47/.000  
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Supplementary Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses 
Combination 1 
 Dependent Variable: 
Compliance 
Ordered Log Odds Regression 
Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std.Error) 
Desire to maintain a good 
reputation with industry 
members 
.89** (.24) 2.44 (.73) 
Appropriate regulatory scope .71 (.38) 2.03 (.65) 
Regulations consistent with 
industry best practices 
.61 (.37) 1.84 (.59) 
Farmer regularly communicates 
with regulating agencies 
 
-.07 (.73) .93 (.65) 
Number of observations 54  
Pseduo R2 22%  
Wald Chi2/sig. 17.69/.001  
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Combination 2 
 Dependent Variable: 
Compliance 
Ordered Log Odds Regression 
Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
 
 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std.Error) 
Guilt .60* (.25) 1.82 (.44) 
Appropriate regulatory scope .64 (.41) 1.89 (.60) 
Regulations consistent with 
industry best practices 
.41 (.35) 1.51 (.47) 
Farmer regularly communicates 
with regulating agencies 
 
.34 (.78) 1.41 (1.00) 
Number of observations 54  
Pseduo R2 19%  
Wald Chi2/sig. 13.93/.008  
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Combination 3 
 Dependent Variable: 
Compliance 
Ordered Log Odds Regression 
Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std.Error) 
Knowledgeable enforcement 
personnel 
.92** (.25) 2.50 (.66) 
Fear of facing financial penalties .46 (.25) 1.59 (.44) 
Moral obligation to produce a 
good product 
 
.52 (.40) 1.67 (.70) 
Number of observations 55  
Pseduo R2 19%  
Wald Chi2/sig. 20.37/.000  
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix B. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
 
Model 1: Multiple regression results for regulatory based compliance motivations and compliance 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance  VIF 
Knowledgeable 
enforcement personnel 
.21* .70 1.43 
Appropriate regulatory 
scope 
.20 .80 1.25 
Regulations consistent with 
industry best practices 
.04 .64 1.57 
Farmer regularly 
communicates with 
regulating agencies 
.02 .94 1.07 
    
Number of observations 54   
Adjusted R2 33%   
F-Statistic/sig. 3.43/0.020   
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Model 2: Ordinary least squares regression results for individual and community based motivations 
and compliance 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Fear of facing financial 
penalties 
.11 .83 1.20 
Desire to maintain good 
reputation with industry 
members 
.23* .74 1.36 
Guilt .14 .75 1.34 
Moral obligation to 
produce a good product 
-.03 .79 1.27 
    
Number of observations 55   
Adjusted R2 29%   
F-Statistic/sig. 3.02/.030   
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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